age-old bifurcation between Ideal spiritual goods and material means: "No one can possibly estimate how much of the obnoxious materialism and brutality of our eco nomic life is due to the fact that economic ends hare been regarded as merely instrumental. When they are recognised to be as intrinsic and final in their place as any others, then it will be seen that they are capable of idealization, and that if life is to be worth while, they must acquire ideal and instrinsic value."® However, lest it seem, as it has to some, that Dewey was exclu sively concerned with material, economic goods, let us observe his estimate of knowledge, a 'spiritual* good. There can be no denying that he placed heavy emphasis upon the instrumental value of knowledge. But he did not ignore the fact that frequently "the pursuit of science is sport, carried on, like other sports, for its own satisfaction;" he did not hesitate to speak of rational reflection as "a unique intrinsic good."' Thhse and other statements from Dewey certainly bring into question the received opinion.
But what has brought about the wide-spread opinion that Dewey rejected intrinsic value in toto? Broadly speaking the belief has been fosterecTby Dewey's repeated criticisms of absolutism in value theory. However, we may divide his attack into three categories, a division which is not found clearly in his writings but which does nothing to violate his thoughts on the subject and which will facilitate treatment of them here. In the first category we may place any view which maintains that intrinsic value exists independently of the interests, needs and attitudes of people. In the second we may place his bbjections to views which maintain that intrinsic value constitutes one universally recognized good, or is something fixed and eternally unchanging, or is unvarying between people, places and contexts. In the third category we may place any view which separates means from ends, instrumental from intrinsic values. I shall now consider, in the order given, Dewey's rejection of these kinds of absolutism in value theory, while arguing that he still retained the notion of intrinsic value as specified above.
II
The first sort of absolutism to which Dewey objected is the attempt to portray the very existence of values as being independent of the desires, interests, feelings or attitudes of people. An example of such an attempt may be found in G. E. Moore's assertion that whatever things are intrinsically valuable are "such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good."® For Moore, at least at one stage in his thought on the matter, the intrinsic value of a thing depends completely upon its intrinsic nature, that is, upon the kind of thing it is in itself apart from any relations it may have to any thing else. This implied, he believed, that a thing can be intrinsically good (or bad) even if it existed entirely alone.
Now Dewey was not opposed to the idea that things have their own natures. From his pluralistic vantage-point
he was even willing to claim that everything in the universe is unique in more than a numerical sense. But this does not imply that the intrinsic nature of a thing, the set of properties which together make the thing what it is, must be such that it can have no relations with other things without becoming something other than wh*t it is. Dewey simply rejected the belief that a quality said to be intrinsic to one thing cannot be the result of another. As he in one place put the point: "Relational properties do not lose their intrinsic quality of being just what they are because their coming into being is caused by something 'extrinsic'. The theory that such is the case would terminate logically in the view that there are no intrinsic qualities what ever, since it can be shown that such intrinsic qualities as red, sweet, hard, etc., are causally conditioned as to their occurrence."9
The case is not different with regard to value quali ties. "The extreme instance of the view that to be intrinsic is to be out of any relation," he suggested, "is found in those writers who hold that, since values are intrinsic, they cannot depend upon any relation whatever, and certainly not upon a relation to human beings."1° So Dewey was highly critical of the idea of something being valuable (or disvaluable) in itself where 'in it s e l f means 'independently of the desires, interests, feelings or attitudes of people'. Toward those who taught that values exist in some unalterable, ready-made, completed way in this world, or in some non-natural realm of essences or spiritual truths, Dewey directed charges of wishful thinking, sentimentality, groundless leaps of rationalistic metaphysics, and miraculous supematuralism. Things may be said to have value qualities, he believed, but such qualities are dependent upon natural interactions between persons and their environments-physical, biological, social, and so on. In Dewey's account, value qualities are disposition al; they do not simply belong to things per se, but as a function of relationships. To say that s o m e n i n g has a quality of value (whether intrinsic or extrinsic; is to imply that someone values; the thing acquires the value quality from someone's valuing of it; valuing confers value upon it. In Dewey's terms: "As a thing previously hard becomes soft when affected by heat, so, on this view, something previously indifferent takes on the quality of value when it is actively cared for in a way that protects or contributes to its continued existence." H 
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Ill Given Dewey's position that a thing can possess intrin sic value even though that value is dependent upon the thing's relationship to valuing persons, it should come as no surprise that he would reject absolutistic concepts of intrinsic value which contained explicitly or implicit ly such ingredients as monism, universality, etemality, or immutability. There is little need to call lengthy attention to his position on these matters. It is well known that his writings abound with opinions of such views, and I suspect that few today would take serious exception to his appraisals. From a naturalistic and empirical perspective he argued that there is no one thing only which people can and do hold to be intrin sically good. Dewey observes: "Certain acts and times are devoted to getting health, others to cultivating religion, others to seeking learning, to being a good citizen, a devotee of fine art and so on. This is the only logical alternative to subordinating all aims to the accomplishment of one alone-fanaticism."1* Again, he denies that values are universal and unchanging, or must be so: "just what is taken to be so fixed and final that man may repose upon it, differs with race, clime, epoch and temperament." 16 None of this means, however, that Dewey gave up the notion of intrinsic value in the sense specified. There is nothing about this concept which requires that whatever it might apply to must be everlasting, or timeless. The length of time an object, event, or activity persists, or the length of time it is valuable, is irrelevant to the notion of its having worth for its own sake. Again, this concept does not imply that only one thing (or kind of thing) could possess it. To say something is of worth for its own sake entails neither that there must be only one, nor an infinite number, nor some definite plurality of such things. Concerning value change, there are various senses of 'change' which could be discussed but I shall mention only one. Value change occurs when a person (or a group of persons for that matter) adheres less (more) to something which he previously adhered more (less) to; this is value change in the ordinary sense in which we say that something is less or more important or valuable than it once was. Such value change may or may not occur in the context of reordering priorities or reranking a set of values. But once more, such value change does not imply that one must give up the notion of intrinsic value completely. It is quite possible on Dewey's view for something to be of worth for its own sake to a person at two or more different times in life, though it is of less (more) worth at one time than at another. Regarding the question of universality, the opinions of many philosophers, both ancient and m o d e m , may be summed up in C. A. Campbell's claim that intrinsic goods are the "good for man," they are "specifically qualified objects of liking to human nature."1* But it may be denied, and I believe Dewey did deny, that the concept of intrinsic worth necessarily implies this; that something is of intrinsic value for one person in no way entails that it is, or must be, so for every person or for any specific number of them. Dewey's criticisms of theories which attempt to attach these non-essentials to the concept of intrinsic value are frequent and, perhaps, even devastating. But he does not completely toss out the concept along with the nonessential accretions.
IV
The third sort of absolutism which Dewey attacked is that which fails to see, or neglects, connections between ends and means. Even more so than his objections to the sorts of absolutism discussed in the previous two sections, Dewey's stance on the means-ends issue has led interpre ters to the belief that he rejected entirely the notion of intrinsic value. For he contends that values are also relational in the sense that the worth of ends (or 'goals', 'aims' as Dewey also calls them) people want to achieve are affected by the means to their achievement, and that ends achieved become means for the possible achievement of other ends. In both cases, where there is neglect of the fact that ends become means, we have an abstrac tion from the actual conditions of life, which can lead to the belief that ends alone justify means and eventually that any end justifies any means, and the be lief that it is unimportant whether or how goals of people are related. Monroe Beardsley is on the right track, then, when he says of Dewey: "What he exposes over and over again is the danger of fixing on goals without reasonable regard to their means and consequences, and he is convinced that the belief in intrinsic value fosters this fixation, with ita attendant train of ills: fana ticism, utopianism, opportunism and the rest. "3-3 For Dewey certainly opposed theories of value which contain or imply fanaticism, utopianism, and opportunism. And he was convinced that various ways of conceiving intrinsic value foster such ills. But it remains to be seen to what extent the danger of fixing on goals without reason able regard to their means and consequences implies a total rejection of intrinsic value.
Means-Affecting-Ends
Not many today will object to Dewey's arguments showing the influence of means upon ends. In fact, most consider this one of his substantial contributions, despite his belaboring of the point. But not enough attention has been paid to its connections with intrinsic value, pre sumably because of the pervasive opinion that Dewey did not, or could not, retain anything of this latter idea. What is implied by the view that the value of an end is relative to the means for its attainment? It may look as though ends could be considered intrinsically valuable up to the point where we bring means into the picture, but at that point ends can no longer possess such value; for, since means contribute to the worth of ends, ends are no longer valuable in themselves, for their own sake. If the value we attribute to an end is relative to the means to it, then the value of the end cannot possibly be a function of the features of the end alone.
But what if ends and means are so related in the actual affairs of life that the worth of an end incorporates within itself the worth of the means to it? Instead of viewing the worth of an end and the worth of means sepa rately, there is nothing to prevent us from viewing them together as a continuum or whole, and so find the continu um or whole intrinsically valuable or not. And this, in However, to say that the worth of an end contains the worth of its means is not the same as saying that the worth of the end is only, no more than, the sum of the worth of means. Some of Dewey's interpreters have been mis leading at this point. For example, Sidney Hook has re marked that for Dewey "the character of the goal 'ultimate ly' reached depends completely upon the character of the 'transitional' instruments used. Not that the aesthetic quality is the same, but rather that the end actually achieved, the end-in-fact, is the result of the whole series of 'transitional' states which precede it, and nothing m o r e . "21 Put into value terms Hook appears to be saying that the value of an end is nothing more than the combined value of the means. But, apart from the possibility of a composition fallacy, it is no marvel that there should be reactions to such thinking, as represented by the follow ing assertion: "Our ability to show that a given interest or desire has been framed in accordance with the conditions 
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needed to realize it does not automatically 'warrant' that end. A goal is not good merely because it can be reached." 22 But I suggest that Dewey did not believe, or teach, that an end is good merely because it can be reached. For example he reminds us that he has "repeatedly and ex plicitly insisted upon the fact that there is no way of telling what the consequences £ r end]5J are save by discov ery of antecedents (or m e a n S but he goes on immediately to add that "the latter afe necessary and yet are subor dinate in f u n c t i o n . " 2 * Antecedents or means are subor dinate in function to consequences or ends. Does not this imply that consequences or ends have a significance which is more than the sum of antecedents or means? And even if there is no way of telling what ends are except by reference to means, it does not follow strictly that the nature of an end and of its means are identical. I repeat, it is one thing to say an end can be valuable for its own sake while including within that value its means; it is quite a different thing to say that it is the means alone which makes an end valuable. So far as I can see there is nothing impossible about thinking of ends as being of worth for their own sake though they be relative to means; the meaning of 'their own sake' may include, but not be exhaust ed by, the meaning of 'means'. However, even if this be erroneous, if it could somehow be shown that Dewey does hold that the value of ends is nothing more than the value of means, the main point still stands-that Dewey conceives of the means-ends relation to be such that the intrinsic value of ends can incorporate the value of means.
Ends-Becoming-Means
Turning now to the other side of the means-ends continue urn, we may note immediately some representative statements of the received opinion. In the words of Baylis, "Dewey objects to intrinsic goods on the ground that nothing is an end and merely an end. life and time and fortune march on and whatever is a result has a r e s u l t . "24 On Dewey's view 
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of the continual and changing flow of human desires and activities, A. E. Murphy opines, "ends can he justified only as means, as ends-in-view or next-things-to-be-aimedat, whose function is to direct choice intelligently in the fruitful furthering of on-going activity and whose worth is to be appraised by their adequacy to perform this function."25 Thus, it is claimed, the justification of ends is always to be found, and found only, in their instrumental role of elemination of blocks and tensions so that human activity may continue. We are supposed to believe that Dewey thought nothing can be valuable apart from its consequences, and therefore that nothing can be intrinsically valuable, of worth for its own sake.
It may be admitted that his persistent emphasis upon this aspect of the means-ends continuum can leave this impression. But the impression is mistaken. In one place where he is discussing the ends-means relation, he characteristically reminds us to be alert to the conse quences of our achieved aims. But in the midst of it he asserts: "There is no call for anxious solicitude as to the contributory property of every immediate good. On the contrary, such a preoccupation would obviously inter fere with the whole-hearted, integral present good and thus reduce or destroy its intrinsic worth."2© Moreover, it is well known that Dewey's view of the means-ends relation includes the proposition that consideration of qpeans is so crucial to the formation of ends that care and concern for means should be as serious as for ends; means are of such importance that they may be, and sometimes are, treated as themselves ends of interest and effort. This is, of course, implied in our previous discussion of how the value of means is integral to the value of ends. Mow means are by definition relational, but this does not imply that things which are means can have no value other than that of being means. As Dewey puts it: "The notion that, when means and instruments are valued, the value- qualities which result are only instrumental is hardly more than a bad pun. There is nothing in the nature of prising or desiring to prevent their being directed to things which are means, and there is nothing in the nature of means to militate against their being desired and p r i s e d . "27 By 'prising* and 'desiring' in this statement Dewey must be referring to something other than prising and desiring things merely as means. Otherwise his state ment would not make any sense. And the implication of this for our present concern is not difficult to see. An end achieved may become a means for achieving other ends, and as a means for achieving other ends it will have utilitarian value. But there is nothing in the nature of prising or desiring ('holding dear', 'loving', 'caring for', 'holding precious', 'honoring', 'esteeming', and 'appreciating' are other terms used by Dewey) to prevent their being directed to ends-which-will-become-means. And there is nothing in the nature of ends-which-will-becomemeans to prevent their being desired and prised for their own sakes. As the terminology indicates, the distinction is temporal, contextual. Achieving an end occurs at some specific point in time, in some context. After this, however, the end achieved can become a means to other ends. To hold that an end of a given action is intrinsi cally valuable is to hold that it is such at some given time, in some context of life. But to say that an end is sought or achieved in some context, at some time, is hot to deny that it can be intrinsically valuable. The Importance of this point, and the amazing fact that so many of Dewey's readers have missed it, justifies I trust, extended discussion of it in the next section.
V
The belief that Dewey thought ends are valuable only as means to further ends does not take account of his explicit teachings about consummately experiences which occur with the achievement of ends-in-view. Contrary to the opinion of Henry Aiken, Dewey did not ignore the consideration that "ends-in-view themselves would be regarded as vain, apart from the genuine consumetory satisfactions and enjoyments which they envisage and to which they may lead." 28 Generally it is this point whicĥ 
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Dewey's critics are concerned to make when ascribing to his value theory the absence of a concept of intrinsic value. Without at least something which is valuable for its own sake, these critics charge, no one would have adequate motivation or reason to do or achieve anything; as Aristotle claimed long ago, if we desired everything for the sake of something else ad infinitum, our desires would be empty and vain. Whether this really is so or not-and it has been argued (for example, by Paul Taylor That is, he must became as fully aware as he can of both the means necessary to achieve each alternative end and the consequences of the necessary means used to achieve each alternative. Such 'dramatic rehearsal', as Dewey calls it, requires the ascertaining of facts of many kinds-physical, psychological, social, economic, and so on; and it is in the light of this that he pleads with us to recognize the possible relevancy to values and morality of all knowledge gained through the various sciences. Having completed inquiry into each alternative end, a person must then make a decision as to which of them he shall actively pursue in that situation.*9 The decision will be, or A s Charles L. Stevenson notes in expositing Dewey: "We cannot go on, indefinitely, with our deliberations about whether or not to yield to certain desires, but must often, in practice, let them freely move us, and set about find ing the means of satisfying them. So we temporarily privilege their objects, taking them as ends in view." (Facts and Values (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p . Ill). Stevenson's discussion, by the way, is the best interpretation of Dewey's stance on intrinsic value with which I am familiar.
should be if it is reasonable, based upon the most accep table means and consequences. As Dewey puts it in one of many places: "Deliberation is actually an imaginative rehearsal of various courses of conduct. Ve give way, in our mind, to some impulse; we try, in our mind, some plan. Following its career through various steps, we find ourselves in imagination in the presence of the consequen ces that would follow; and as we then like and approve, or dislike and disapprove, these consequences, we find the original impulse or plan good or bad."30 This selection of an end from among alternatives is the taking of an end-in-view. Ends-in-view are "aims, things viewed after deliberation as worthy of attainment and as evocative of effort."31 Or, an end-in-view may be described as that plan which a person has decided upon from among alterna tives as the best way to resolve a problematic situation. The latter is unsettled, indeterminate, disturbed; we want to settle it, bring it into balance and harmony. Ends-inview are objectives, purposes, goals consciously employed to help us see whit we are about; they enable us to under stand what we are doing, why we are doing it and where our doings lead.
But people do not just keep ends-in-view in view; they attempt to, and do, attain at least some of them. People do not want to live continually in problematic situations; they want to, and do, straighten out at least some of them. And with this we come to the major point. The achievement of an end-in-view, the resolving of a problematic situation, is not merely a termination of a natural process, a closing of a temporal episode, a last event in a series of events. Rather, it is the realizing of an aim, the purposeful restoration of harmony and stability to a discordant and unstable state of affairs, the culmination of natural processes by insightful control of appropriate means. Dewey thus refers to ends-in-view-achieved as "fulfill ments", "completions" , "perfections", "secondarily natural, or practical, moral" endings.such endings are consum-°J A piece of work is finished in a way that is satis factory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conver sation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. This is not just an experience the meaning and vilue of which is to be found elsewhere; its meaning and value is to be found in itself. As Dewey remarks elsewhere in a passage dealing with the dual meaning of 'value':34 Such terms as 'meaning', 'significance', 'value', have a double sense. Sometimes they mean a function: the office of one thing representing another, or pointing to it as implied; the operation, in short, of serving as a sign. . . . But the terms also sometimes mean an inherent quality, a quality intrin sically characterizing the thing experienced and making it worth while.
Then he goes on to say:
In the situation which follows upon reflection, mean ings [Significances, valueJJare intrinsic; they have no instrumental or subservient office, because they have no office at all.
That moments of consummatory experience, in the ever moving stream of life, can and often do become stepping stones for further experiences may easily be admitted without damage to their presentation of intrinsic worth. Dewey does dwell much on the future as the locus of the meaning of ideas and actions; and it may appear, since the future is always receding, that we never arrive at it, and so never arrive at the meaning of ideas and actions. However, though we never arrive at the future, we do arrive at moments which were, in the past, future moments. Some of these moments are moments where we are aware of having arrived there through choice and action based upon know ledge of ourselves and the environment, moments where the outcome of nature's processes is to some extent guided by our preferences, attitudes, likings and by our abilities to order and control forces. Such moments taken one at a time do give meaning and value to ideas and actions; for they are moments when ideas and actions have made possible the direct delights and enjoyments which might not other wise have occuretid, or occurred to a lesser degree. Ve should not assume that Dewey's attack on theories which place intrinsic values beyond the temporal process contains the implication that there are no moments in time where such values can be found. While noting his rejection of final values existing beyond the natural realm, we must not fail to see the sense in which values can be final within that realm.35 A Value is final in the sense that it represents the conclusion of a process of analytic appraisals of con ditions operating in a concrete case, the conditions including impulses and desires on one side and exter nal conditions on the other. . . . The quality or property of value that is correlated with the last desire formed in the process of valuation is, tauto logically, ultimate for that particular situation.
Contrary to wide-spread opinion, then, intrinsic worth present at moments of consummatory experience is so much a part of Dewey's value philosophy that it is no exaggera tion to say it is a central thmme. This fact has been obscured no doubt by so much discussion and controversy revolving around certain of his emphases, such as his problem-oriented instrumentalism, his appeal to scientifiĉ Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 45.
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F-10 method, his concern with educational and social reform, and his denial of dualisms of various sorts. But X think we may fairly say that these emphases serve his interest in developing a naturalistic philosophy of human experi ence which makes room for as many, and as rich, consummatory experiences as possible. When Dewey emphasises the importance of scientific method, it is because he is convinced that this method is the best possible way of understanding and controlling ourselves and our world so as to create conditions for consummatory experience. "Thought, intelligence, science," he claims, "is the intentional direction of natural events to meanings capable of immediate possession and enjoyment."'® When he stresses the practical, problem-solving character of thought, it is because consummatory moments of life occur in concrete conditions as a result of practical thinking. Wien he argues for economic, political and social reform, one of his chief concerns is the creation, multiplication and distribution of opportunities for consummatory experi ences. And, one of his purposes in dealing with education was to rid people of the notion that the experiences of childhood are, or should be, but instrumentally valuable to later adult life. VI I cannot close without calling attention to what seems to be another misunderstanding of Dewey. Some interpreters believe that, whether he was aware of it or not, Dewey's value theory does contain reference to at least one intrin sic v a l u e -problem solving. For example, Gail Kennedy has suggested that there is a 'hidden link' in Dewey's theory of value which critics have failed to see. Various critics have complained that in Dewey's discussion of means and ends, and of resolving problematic situations, he never really tells us how statements about the facts of a situation imply judgments about what ought to be done, what is best to do in the situation; he does not relate why or how it is that certain means and consequences of action justify choice of some alternative ends over others. What these critics have missed, Kennedy thinks, is that for Dewey the justification for moving from factual state ments to normative judgments is simply the demand, the n eed, of problematic situations to be adequately sealed,
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Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 358. It must be admitted that sometimes Dewey's assertions seem to warrant this line of interpretation. The "sole meaning of aims and purposes," he says in one place, is "to liberate and guide present action out of its perplex ities and confusinns" in problematic situations.39 it may even seem that Dewey is giving a definition of 'good' consistent with this view in the following: "Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release in action."4° However, I suggest that the above inter pretation of Dewey leaves out something crucial, that it neglects the most important 'hidden link' in his theory of value. My contention is that we should understand Dewey as holding, at least most often, that it is some object, event, or activity internal to the situation, not the resolving of the situation itself, which is the motive of the agent's thought, choice and action, and also the sourcê
